“War! What is it good for?”
-Edwin Starr
The recent titles on PC industry trade articles speak volumes with regard to the current state of the industry. “Dog Watch,” “Will PCs Rebound? Doubt it,” and “A PC Pessimist” are three examples that highlight the current view–the PC industry is in a tough spot. Worldwide growth is slowing from the once-guaranteed 20%+ a year to somewhere closer to the 10%-15% range a year, while U.S. growth is barely up and could easily decline. And while the current state of the economy is always mentioned as a contributor, analysts seem worried about something greater: saturation.
If this were not enough, Dell Computer, the investment community’s perennial favorite, launched an aggressive price war in the fourth quarter, which continues unabated now six months later as we near the end of the second quarter. Referring to the current price battle in the May 11 issue of the Wall Street Journal, IBM’s Lou Gerstner noted, “Price wars in a commodity business are really dumb.” All of which begs the question, is this a commodity business?, or has Michael Dell become smitten with a strategy that, in Lou’s words, is less than smart.
In a business context, commodity is typically used to describe a product or service where differential advantage is difficult to achieve, and as such pricing is typically the sole determinant in terms of the customer’s purchase decision. Interestingly, the issue with Mr. Gerstner’s statement may not be in the adjective, but rather the object of that adjective. It would be hard to argue that the personal computer is not a commodity product. However, it is not at all clear that the PC industry is a commodity business.
If a commodity product is one where no one can establish a differential advantage, then it would follow that a commodity business is one where no participant can obtain a differentiated business advantage. However, even in tough times, Dell’s business model stands head and shoulders above its competitors’. Dell’s competitive advantage comes not from building better boxes per se, but from building them smarter and faster, and consuming fewer resources in the process.
Much has been written about Dell’s direct model, which removes the middleman, along with his margin, from the sales process. And others have noted that Dell’s incredible five days of inventory allow it to pass on component price declines faster than anyone else in the industry. But perhaps the unique aspect of Dell’s business advantage is its negative cash conversion cycle. Because it keeps only five days of inventories, manages receivables to 30 days, and pushes payables out to 59 days, the Dell model will generate cash—even if the company were to report no profit whatsoever.
Dell is clearly the low-cost leader when it comes to looking solely at the income statement. The company has continued to generate a substantial profit margin even as other vendors struggle. For instance, IBM’s personal-systems division lost $58 million on revenues of $3.17 billion in the first quarter. However, Dell’s balance-sheet advantage is the added kicker here. Even in an environment where a price war eliminates all profitability—including that of Dell–the company will remain cash-flow positive. No wonder then that Dell would be willing to start a price war, and no wonder that IBM would find it “dumb.”
Dell’s “price war” timing is particularly clever. First, the tough economic environment leaves stocks depressed and investors more forgiving of lower expectations. Why try to hit home-run numbers when you are not likely to get much credit for it? Second, with most customers eyeing their own bottom line, they are much more likely to be influenced by the low-price sales pitch. Lastly, the weak economic environment makes it even more difficult for Dell’s competitors to fight back—which is exactly what Dell is counting on.
By pushing for market-share gains through a price war mechanism, Dell has presented its competitors with a true lose-lose dilemma. On one hand, you can try to maintain market share by pricing alongside Dell. The problem is that because of its business model advantage, Dell can stand in the deep end of the pool forever. If you wade down there with them, you are likely to run out of oxygen before too long. Currently, Gateway is the only player that has followed this path, and understandably so. As the only other large player with a completely direct strategy, Gateway is best equipped to ride out the war.
The other possible response, and the one that has been chosen by IBM and HP, is to declare the price war “irrational.” The problem here is that along the way you lose market share, and Dell continues its tear that led it to become the number one maker of PCs in the world in the first quarter of 2001. Sitting out the war is equally as dangerous as entering it, which is precisely why Dell’s decision to push the pedal during these tough times is so remarkably shrewd.
There is another reason that makes the timing of this assault astute. While Dell’s competitors are well aware of the advantages it has, they have yet to “catch up” in terms of operating efficiency. As such, it certainly makes sense to go for the knockout punch now while the size of the advantage is so obvious. Waiting will only give the others time to study the relative advantages and mimic them.
There is a real risk that Dell’s price-war moves will permanently raise the bar in terms of the business model needed to be competitive in the PC industry. In the past, every down tick in gross margin has indeed been permanent, and the rest of the income statement has adjusted accordingly. In this light, the decision by some to sit out the war may in fact be the first step towards sitting out the industry. The screws are turning deeper, and Mr. Dell is asking everyone to put up or shut up—hoping that they choose the latter, and hoping that they eventually exit the business.